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Climate change is expected to have significant influences on terrestrial biodiversity at 21 
all system levels, including species-level reductions in range size and abundance, 22 
especially amongst endemic species1-6. However, little is known about how mitigation of 23 
greenhouse gas emissions could reduce biodiversity impacts, particularly amongst 24 
common and widespread species. Our global analysis of future climatic range change of 25 
common and widespread species shows that without mitigation, 57±6% of plants and 26 
34±7% of animals are likely to lose ≥50% of their current climatic range by the 2080s. 27 
With mitigation, however, losses are reduced by 60% if emissions peak in 2016 or 40% 28 
if emissions peak in 2030. Thus, our analyses indicate that without mitigation, large 29 
range contractions can be expected even amongst common and widespread species, 30 
amounting to a substantial global reduction in biodiversity and ecosystem services by 31 
the end of this century. Prompt and stringent mitigation, on the other hand, could 32 
substantially reduce range losses and ‘buy’ up to four decades for climate change 33 
adaptation. 34 
The IPCC3 estimates that 20-30% of species would be at increasingly high risk of 35 
extinction if global temperature rise exceeds 2-3°C above pre-industrial levels. However, 36 
since quantitative assessments of the benefits of mitigation in avoiding biodiversity loss are 37 
lacking, we know little about how much of the impacts can be offset by reductions in 38 
greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, despite the large number of studies addressing 39 
extinction risks in particular species groups, we know little about the broader issue of 40 
potential range loss in common and widespread species, which is of serious concern as even 41 
small declines in such species can significantly disrupt ecosystem structure, function and 42 
services7.  43 
Here we quantify the benefits of mitigation in terms of reduced climatic range losses 44 
in common and widespread species, and determine the time early mitigation action can “buy” 45 
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for adaptation. In particular, we provide (i) a comprehensive analysis of potential climatic 46 
range changes for 48,786 animal and plant species across the globe, using the same set of 47 
global climate change scenarios for all species; and (ii) a direct comparison of projected 48 
levels of potential climate change impacts on the climatic ranges of species in six 21st century 49 
mitigation scenarios, including a ‘no policy’ baseline scenario in which emissions continue to 50 
rise unabated (Fig. 1, Table 1). To calculate the climatic range changes, we employed 51 
MaxEnt, one of the most robust bioclimatic modelling approaches for cases where only 52 
presence data (as opposed to presence-absence) are available8. MaxEnt models the 53 
probability of a species’ presence, conditioned on environment8 so that in this paper ‘climatic 54 
range change’ specifically refers to the change in the modelled probability of a species’ 55 
occurrence, conditioned on climatic variables. Eighty percent of the species studied have 56 
climatic ranges in excess of 30,000 km2, which is the range size used by Bird Life 57 
International to delineate ‘restricted range species’, whilst less than 7% have ranges 58 
occupying less than 20,000 km2 (Supplementary Fig. S1). Our study therefore focuses on 59 
quantifying the effects on widespread species, which are in general more common and less 60 
likely to become extinct than restricted range species9, in contrast to previous studies that 61 
have only speculated that there may be effects such species1-6 . In projecting future 62 
distributions, we use three class-specific long-term average ‘dispersal’ scenarios (zero, 63 
realistic, and optimistic). These scenarios are based on the available literature and specifically 64 
refer to the rates at which species’ ranges, through an average of individual dispersal events 65 
(colonization and extirpation), shift over time (Supplementary Table S1, and Supplementary 66 
Methods).  67 
With no mitigation, the median global annual mean temperature change reaches 4°C 68 
above pre-industrial levels by 2100 (Fig1, Table 1, A1B baseline scenario). Even with 69 
realistic dispersal rates, 34±7% of the animals, and 57±6% of the plants lose 50% or more of 70 
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their climatic range by the 2080s (Table 1, Fig. 2). Here, the standard deviation arises from 71 
the use of different GCM patterns for downscaling (see Methods). With no long-term 72 
dispersal (also reflecting the potential for barriers to inhibit realistic dispersal), 42±7% of the 73 
animals lose 50% or more of their climatic range, whilst the figures for plants remain 74 
unchanged owing to their lower dispersal rates (Table 1). The projected climatic range losses 75 
under these realistic long-term dispersal assumptions demonstrate clearly that climate change 76 
would have an impact even on more widespread species in addition to the species with 77 
restricted ranges that have been the main focus of previous studies3,10. These projected losses 78 
are not offset by the very small percentage of species projected to gain more than 50% of 79 
their climatic range with realistic dispersal rates (4% of the animals and none of the plants) 80 
(Supplementary Table S3) indicating that on balance the projected impacts of climate change 81 
overwhelmingly result in a sizable reduction of climatically suitable ranges for a large 82 
number of species.  83 
With mitigation (i.e., global emissions peak in 2016-2030 and are subsequently 84 
reduced by 2-5% annually; Fig. 1, Table 1), median global annual mean temperature rise is 85 
limited to 2.0-2.8°C with a 7-45% likelihood that it will be constrained to 2°C above pre-86 
industrial levels. The highest emission reduction rates considered in most integrated 87 
modelling studies which attempt to minimise mitigation cost is typically between 3 and 4%11, 88 
whilst other studies highlight that for an additional cost slightly higher rates of up to 5% may 89 
be achievable12. Hence the most stringent mitigation scenario considered here allows global 90 
emissions to peak in 2016 and to be subsequently reduced by 5% annually (Fig. 1, Table 1). 91 
In this scenario, with realistic dispersal rates, the proportion of species losing at least half 92 
their climatic range by the 2080s falls from 34±7% to 13±3% in animals, and from 57±6% to 93 
23±4% in plants (Table 1), thus avoiding ~60% of the potential impacts with smaller benefits 94 
accruing by the 2050s (Fig. 2). If mitigation is delayed (i.e., global emissions peak in 2030) 95 
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and are then reduced at 5% annually, cumulative emissions during the 21st century rise 96 
correspondingly. In this case, substantially fewer climatic range contractions are avoided 97 
(Table 1, Fig. 2). With these mitigation delays, the proportion of animals losing at least half 98 
their climatic range rises from 13±3% to 20±6%, and the proportion of plants rises from 99 
23±4% to 35±6% with realistic dispersal (Table 1, Fig. 2), thus reducing climatic range losses 100 
by only ~40% relative to the baseline.  101 
These patterns and trends are also observed in the individual animal taxa (Fig. 2), 102 
under all dispersal scenarios (Supplementary Fig. S2a-f), as well as in the proportions of 103 
species losing >=70%, >=90% or >=99% of their climatic ranges (Supplementary Table S4a-104 
c). Plants, amphibians and reptiles would be expected to be more at risk from climate change 105 
due to their lower long-term dispersal rates relative to the velocity of climate change13. 106 
Consistent with Lawler et al.13, our projections suggest that amphibians are most at risk from 107 
climate change, with 50±7% of species losing over 50% of their climatic range under a 108 
realistic dispersal scenario, dropping to 28±7% with stringent mitigation. Our analysis 109 
revealed that in all taxa, distributions were on average more strongly driven by temperature 110 
than by precipitation, although many species are more strongly affected by precipitation 111 
(Supplementary Table S2a-c).  112 
Corresponding, but smaller, increases in the proportions of species losing larger 113 
percentages of their climatic range were also seen. Our estimates of the proportion of species 114 
losing more than 90% of their climatic ranges (for example 2-6% of animals with realistic 115 
dispersal rates; Supplementary Fig. S2, Supplementary Table S4b) largely omit more 116 
restricted-range species that have previously been shown to be highly vulnerable to climate 117 
change. Our focus on widespread species makes our figures much lower, and not comparable 118 
to, previous estimates of climate-change induced commitment to extinction3,14. However, all 119 
mitigation scenarios examined deliver substantial reductions of (at least) 40-60% in the 120 
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number of species incurring these large climatic range losses (Supplementary Table S4a-c), 121 
for all categories (ranging from ≥50% to ≥99% loss), for all long-term dispersal scenarios, 122 
and for all taxa.  123 
The impacts of climate change and benefits of stringent mitigation action are not 124 
geographically uniform (Fig. 3a,b). With no mitigation, the climate becomes particularly 125 
unsuitable for both plants and animals in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, Amazonia, 126 
and Australia. Major loss of plant species is also projected for North Africa, Central Asia, and 127 
Southeastern Europe. We used the number of species from our study with suitable climate 128 
predicted in each grid cell as an indicator of species richness. With stringent mitigation, 129 
species richness in many of the affected areas shown in figure 3a,b is less impacted (i.e., 130 
more preserved) (Fig. 3c,d). Benefits (Fig. 3e,f) are particularly strong in Sub-Saharan Africa, 131 
Central America, Amazonia, Australia, North Africa, Central Asia, and Southeastern Europe. 132 
In areas where species richness is projected to increase, gains are generally below 5%. 133 
Corresponding maps for the less stringent mitigation scenarios (i.e., if global emissions peak 134 
in 2030) show smaller, but still positive, benefits (Supplementary Fig. S3a-f). In many of 135 
these areas, land use changes will be acting synergistically15 with climate-induced 136 
autonomous range shifts.  137 
In all cases, stringent early mitigation not only reduces the level of risk to the taxa, it 138 
also postpones the changes that would otherwise be incurred by the late 2030s to the 2080s, 139 
thus ‘buying’ approximately four decades of time for autonomous or planned adaptation (Fig. 140 
2a, blue dashed arrow). More generally, levels of adaptation required to adapt to a 141 
temperature rise of 2ºC above pre-industrial levels could be required before 2050 if there is 142 
no mitigation (Fig. 1b), whereas with stringent mitigation these levels are not required until 143 
the end of the century. Adaptation is further facilitated as the rate of climate change is 144 
consistently lower in the mitigation scenarios than in the baseline case, so that adaptation to 145 
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the higher rates of climate change are no longer required. Thus, this type of analysis can help 146 
quantify the trade-offs between varying levels of climate change mitigation and adaptation 147 
needs. 148 
In the more stringent mitigation scenarios in which global emissions peak in 2016, 149 
climate change stops increasing by the end of the century (Fig. 1b). In all cases, earlier 150 
mitigation results in greater avoidance of range losses (60%), and buys more time for 151 
adaptation. Delay in the date at which global emissions peak causes reduced effectiveness 152 
even if higher emission reduction rates are implemented subsequent to the peak. Thus, the 153 
date of peak emissions is key to the efficacy of mitigation in avoiding the risks to biodiversity. 154 
Fee et al.11 use the same methodology as in this study to show that constraining median 155 
global temperature rise to 2 ºC if emissions peak in 2016 requires a subsequent emission 156 
reduction rate of 3-4%, but if the emission peak is delayed by 5 years, a reduction rate of 6% 157 
is required to constrain median temperature rise to 2 ºC. Thus, the date of peak emissions is 158 
arguably more important than the overall amount in terms of reduced impacts and the 159 
adaptation time that can be ‘bought’. Whist some studies highlight that mitigation rates of up 160 
to 5% (as considered here) may be achievable16, mitigation at faster rates is widely 161 
considered to be infeasible, and thus the possibility that widespread climate change impacts 162 
on biodiversity can be avoided if mitigation is delayed seems remote. 163 
In our analyses, all of the patterns were found to be robust, for all animals combined, 164 
in separate analyses of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and plants, and in analyses of 165 
individual families. Our method encompassed uncertainties in both climate change 166 
projections and in the potential ability of species to disperse to areas that become newly 167 
climatically suitable. While some authors caution that these types of studies might 168 
overestimate potential impactse.g.,17, our overall estimates of biodiversity diminution at this 169 
scale are likely conservative due to the expected compounding effects of increases in extreme 170 
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weather events, pests, diseases, and barriers to dispersal, as well as to changes in trophic or 171 
mutualistic interactions (see Supplementary Material for discussion). In particular, our 172 
estimates for animals will be underestimated due to their dependence on plants. Actual levels 173 
of risk in all classes would also be expected to be higher due to the concomitant impacts of 174 
other environmental stresses, such as land use change, water and soil contamination, and 175 
because extremes associated with increased inter-annual variability3 could constrain rates of 176 
dispersal that might otherwise be considered realistic18. Moreover, the rate at which 177 
emissions are currently increasing exceeds that in our baseline scenario for the current 178 
decade19.  179 
In conclusion, our projections indicate that without climate change mitigation, large 180 
climatic range contractions can be expected, amounting to a substantial global reduction in 181 
biodiversity and ecosystem services by the end of this century. However, prompt, stringent 182 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has the potential to avoid the risk of systemic 183 
biodiversity diminution of common and widespread species, with concomitant declines in 184 
ecosystem services, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Amazon, Australia, North Africa, 185 
Central Asia and Southeastern Europe. With prompt, stringent mitigation, levels of adaptation 186 
that would be required by the late 2030s are not required until the 2080s, whereas if 187 
mitigation is delayed such that global emissions do not peak until 2030 then substantially 188 
fewer risks to biodiversity can be avoided.  189 
 190 
Methods 191 
We used greenhouse gas emissions time series, specifically the SRES A1B baseline 192 
scenario20 and mitigation scenarios21, to drive a global climate change model 193 
MAGICC4.122,23 capable of reproducing global mean warming from model complex global 194 
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circulation models which have yet to be run and analysed for stringent mitigation scenarios. 195 
In the mitigation scenarios, emissions follow the baseline before transitioning over seven 196 
years so that they peak globally in either 2016 or 2030, and are reduced subsequently at rates 197 
of between 2 and 5% annually until reaching a lower limit, representing emissions that might 198 
be difficult to eliminate. The resultant projections of global temperature change drove a 199 
pattern-scaling module ClimGen24,25 in which scaled climate change patterns diagnosed from 200 
seven alternative GCM simulations are combined with a baseline climate. Thus we produced 201 
42 spatially-explicit time series projections of monthly mean, minimum and maximum 202 
temperatures, and total precipitation, downscaled to 0.5°x0.5° and consistent with the IPCC26. 203 
This was post-processed to produce 8 bioclimatic indices for our subsequent modelling of 204 
species’ current and future climate space27,28. Biodiversity records were sourced from the 205 
Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF)29 and vetted for locational reliability (see 206 
Supplementary Material). We used MaxEnt27,28 to create statistical relationships between the 207 
vetted species occurrence records and current (1961-1990) climate, and to calculate the 208 
current geographic distribution of each species27,30. To eliminate potential omission and 209 
commission biases, distributions were then ‘clipped’ to the bio-geographic zone(s)31 from 210 
which the species information was derived and to a conservative 2000 km buffer around the 211 
species’ outermost occurrence records. Next, we used the projected climates and trained 212 
models to derive potential future distribution for each species in our future climate scenarios 213 
for 30 year periods centered on 2025, 2055 and 2085, applying three class-specific long-term 214 
‘dispersal’ rate scenarios (zero, realistic, and optimistic) that were restricted to contiguous 215 
land areas. This enabled us to estimate the proportions of species losing ≥50, ≥70, ≥90 or 216 
≥99% of their climatically suitable range under the various future climate and dispersal rate 217 
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Figure Legends 308 
 309 
Figure 1 Global greenhouse emissions (a) and projected annual global mean near-surface 310 
temperature rise in the AVOID scenarios (b). Solid lines refer to median temperature rise, 311 
whilst shaded bars provide a 10-90% range (see Supplementary Material for details). (Key to 312 
mitigation scenario names: A1B- xxxx-y-z where ‘xxxx’ refers to the year during which 313 
global greenhouse gas emissions peak, ‘y’ refers to the rate (%/year) at which emissions 314 
subsequently decline, and ‘z’ refers to whether the final emissions floor level is set to high 315 
(H) or low (L). 316 
 317 
Figure 2 Proportion of species losing ≥50% of their range by the 2080s with realistic 318 
dispersal, under the baseline scenario (red), and in the mitigation scenarios with emissions 319 
peaking in 2030 (green) or 2016 (blue), respectively, for (a) plants (b) animals (c) 320 
amphibians (d) birds, (e) mammals and (f) amphibians. The shaded areas show the 321 
uncertainties arising from use of a range of GCM patterns for creating downscaled climate 322 
projections, as well as over the use of two (green) or three (blue) different mitigation 323 
scenarios. Red lines show trends for emission pathway SRES A1B without mitigation, whilst 324 
green and blue pathways show those with mitigation in which global greenhouse gas 325 
emissions peak in 2030 and in 2016, respectively. The corresponding green and blue dashed 326 
arrows in (a) show the adaptation time ‘bought’ in the AVOID2030 and the AVOID2016 327 
scenarios (2038 to 2080 and 2048 to 2080, respectively); the dashed arrows are represented 328 




Figure 3 Species richness of animal (a, c) and plant (b, d) species in the 2080s under realistic 331 
dispersal for the stringent mitigation case in which global greenhouse gas emissions peak in 332 
2016 and are subsequently reduced at 5% annually (c, d) compared with the no mitigation 333 
case SRES A1B (a, b). Panels (e, f) show the species richness change that is avoided by such 334 
mitigation. White areas are those where no data exist in the GBIF network. Species richness 335 
gains occur only on the edges of these white areas, where it is an artefact of data paucity, and 336 




Table 1 Proportions of plants and animals losing ≥50% of their current range due to climate 339 
change alone by the 2080s in the various emissions scenarios under no dispersal (ND), 340 
realistic dispersal (RD), or optimistic dispersal (OD). Ranges show variation arising from use 341 
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